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I. INTRODUCTION
I am very honored and humbled to have been chosen as this year’s speaker
in the field of international commercial arbitration, not least because of the
distinction of those who preceded me, a line of legal luminaries who are
household names in the world of arbitration.
I willingly acknowledge that, at first sight, my subject matter, Long Live
the Golden Summer: Arbitration, Litigation, and Colas,1 may seem a little
frivolous compared with, for example, Commercial Arbitration under the
* Yves Fortier is a past President of the London Court of International Arbitration and

of the Canadian Bar Association. From 1984 to 1989, he was a member of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration. From July 1988 until February 1992, he was Canada’s Ambassador
and Permanent Representative to the United Nations (“UN”). In 1989, he was President
of the UN Security Council. From 1992 until 2008, he was Chairman of Norton Rose
and then Chairman Emeritus until he began practicing as an independent
mediator/arbitrator. From 2012 to 2015, Mr. Fortier was Chairman of the Sanctions
Board of the World Bank. In 2013, Mr. Fortier was appointed to Canada’s Security and
Intelligence Review Committee and sworn in as a member of the Privy Council. In
August 2016, he was appointed Chairman of the Enforcement Committee of the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“EBRD”).
1. I would like to acknowledge and thank my colleague Trevor May for his
thorough research and invaluable assistance in the preparation of my lecture.
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Scrutiny of Human Rights Courts and Investment Tribunals2 by my friend,
Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, or Legal Risks for Product Liability3 by my
friend, Johnny Veeder, among the topics developed by previous lecturers.
Nevertheless, I will attempt to entertain and educate you in the next hour
about how colas and arbitration have a great deal in common.
As you will no doubt recall, long before the Game of Thrones, there was
the “Game of Colas”: the so-called “Cola Wars” between Pepsi and CocaCola.4 In the over 100 years that the brands have competed head-to-head,
Coca-Cola has usually prevailed. Today, Coca-Cola’s share of the cola
market is almost twice that of Pepsi’s.5
However, in the mid-1980s, winter was coming for the “Official Soft
Drink of Summer.”6 Coca-Cola’s market share, while still larger than
Pepsi’s, was eroding.7 Pepsi’s growth had outpaced Coca-Cola’s for over a
decade, and “by 1983, Pepsi was outselling Coca-Cola in supermarkets.”8
In the heat of this battle, Pepsi launched one of the most effective
marketing campaigns of all time, to which Coca-Cola would respond with
the “marketing blunder of the century.”9 In the “Pepsi Challenge,”
consumers undertook a double-blind taste test of both colas. The results
shocked Coca-Cola lovers: blindfolded participants preferred the taste of
Pepsi.10
Under threat, Coca-Cola scrambled to fight back. It decided to fight fire
2. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Professor, University of Geneva School of Law,
Address at the American University Washington College of Law Annual Lecture on
International Commercial Arbitration: Commercial Arbitration under Scrutiny of
Human Rights Courts & Investment Tribunals (2011), in 29 ARB. INT’L 153, 153 (2013).
3. V.V. Veeder, Queen’s Counsel, England and Wales, Arbitrator, Address at the
American University Washington College of Law Annual Lecture on International
Commercial Arbitration: Arbitrators and Arbitral Institutions: Legal Risks for Product
Liability? (2012), in 5 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 335, 335 (2016).
4. Matthew Yglesias, Sweet Sorrow: Coke Won the Cola Wars Because Great
Taste Takes More than a Single Sip, SLATE (Aug. 9, 2013, 8:15 AM), https://slate.com/
business/2013/08/pepsi-paradox-why-people-prefer-coke-even-though-pepsi-wins-intaste-tests.html.
5. Id.
6. See History of Coca-Cola Advertising Slogans, THE COCA-COLA COMPANY,
https://www.coca-colacompany.com/stories/coke-lore-slogans (last visited Nov. 28,
2020) (branding Coca-Cola the “Official Soft Drink of Summer” in 1989).
7. Yglesias, supra note 4.
8. Yglesias, supra note 4.
9. The Story of One of the Most Memorable Marketing Blunders Ever, THE COCACOLA COMPANY, https://www.coca-colacompany.com/stories/coke-lore-new-coke (last
visited Nov. 28, 2020).
10. Yglesias, supra note 4.
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with fire. Coca-Cola reformulated its storied recipe to create a sweeter flavor
intended to outcompete Pepsi, as well as the original Coca-Cola, in taste
tests.11 The result: “New Coca-Cola,” a product designed to beat Pepsi at
its own game.
It did not. Following New Coca-Cola’s release, 400,000 customers sent a
tsunami of complaints to Coca-Cola, and Coca-Cola was even sued by
partners in its distribution chain.12 Aside from this collateral damage, the
plan failed even more spectacularly with respect to its entire raison d’être:
outcompeting Pepsi. During New Coca-Cola’s first month on the market,
Pepsi had its fastest-ever sales growth.13
But why? Coca-Cola had designed a product that outperformed both Pepsi
and Coca-Cola in a blind taste test. Shouldn’t that product have gone on to
dominate the market? It turns out that there is a difference between what
people like to taste and what people like to drink. With its taste tests, Pepsi
was exploiting a cognitive loophole: in beverage taste tests, people prefer
sweeter flavors.14 The pattern holds for both colas and wine,15 but that test
result does not necessarily mean that people want to drink a sweeter
beverage. Pepsi wins when you just take a sip, but people do not buy soft
drinks just to take one sip.
Moreover, even though Pepsi was growing faster than Coca-Cola in the
1980s, Coca-Cola still had millions of loyal customers.16 Millions of loyal
customers who did not want Pepsi.17 Irrespective of taste, Coca-Cola’s
customers felt betrayed by the company’s decision to replace the product that
had secured their loyalty in order to win over customers who had never been
loyal to the brand.18
So why am I, an arbitrator from Montreal, talking about colas at an
international commercial arbitration lecture in Washington? I recount the
“New Coca-Cola” story to you this evening because it offers a valuable
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. (contending that blind taste tests showed participants also preferred
sweeter wine).
16. Id.
17. See id. (reporting that Coca-Cola’s customers in the 1980s “weren’t looking for
a new flavor”).
18. See Becky Little, How the ‘Blood Feud’ Between Coke and Pepsi Escalated
During the 1980s Cola Wars, HISTORY CHANNEL, https://www.history.com/news/colawars-pepsi-new-coke -failure (last updated Mar. 12, 2020) (detailing the anger CocaCola customers felt toward the company when it replaced the formula).
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lesson for the arbitration world.
Consider the current state of international arbitration. For decades,
international arbitration has developed and improved, achieving success in
new markets and on an ever-increasing scale. In 2018, parties registered a
record fifty-six cases at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (“ICSID”), a new record.19 The record year before 2018 was 2017,
and the record year before 2017 was 2015.20 Similarly, 2018 was also a
record-breaking year for the London Court of International Arbitration
(“LCIA”)21 and the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”)
International Court of Arbitration.22 In 2018, in a wide-ranging survey of
practitioners, academics, judges, third-party funders, government officials,
expert witnesses, economists, entrepreneurs, and others, ninety-seven
percent responded that “international arbitration is their preferred method”
of resolving cross-border disputes.23
Yet, for decades, we have been told that arbitration must be stopped.24
Recently, the death chants have intensified. Investor-State Dispute
Settlement (“ISDS”) “should be dismantled and either discarded or rebuilt
from scratch.”25 Gary Born warns us that “winter is coming.”26
The “White Walkers”27 in this dispute resolution Game of Thrones have
19. Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disps. [ICSID], The ICSID Caseload —
Statistics, at 7, Issue 2019-1 (2019), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resour
ces/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202019-1(English).pdf.
20. Id.
21. LONDON COURT OF INT’L ARBITRATION, 2018 ANNUAL CASEWORK REPORT 3
(2018).
22. See ICC Arbitration Figures Reveal New Record for Awards in 2018, INT’L
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Nov. 6, 2019), https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/
icc-arbitration-figures-reveal-new-record-cases-awards-2018/ (announcing that 2018
had the second-highest number of ICC cases ever reported).
23. WHITE & CASE, 2018 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: THE EVOLUTION
OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2 (2018), https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/
files/files/download/publications/qmul-international-arbitration-survey-2018-19.pdf.
24. See Anthony Depalma, Nafta’s Powerful Little Secret; Obscure Tribunals Settle
Disputes, but Go Too Far, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2001), https://www.ny
times.com/2001/03/11/business/nafta-s-powerful-little-secret-obscure-tribunals-settledisputes-but-go-too-far.html (discussing opponents’ arguments against tribunal
arbitration).
25. Jaroslav Kudrna & Anna Bilanová, The New Age of the Megacase, 13 GLOBAL
ARB. REV. 14, 16 (2019).
26. Alison Ross, Winter Is Coming: Is Arbitration’s “Long, Golden Summer”
Coming to an End? 13 GLOBAL ARB. REV. 7, 8 (2019) [hereinafter Ross, Winter Is
Coming].
27. The “White Walkers” are one of the main antagonists in the television show
Game of Thrones and represent a persistent threat to the Seven Kingdoms. Game of
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mobilized, and the “New Coca-Cola” of international dispute resolution has
arrived. Most notably, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(“CETA”) between the European Union (“EU”) and Canada contains a
proposal for a permanent investment court, the Investment Court System
(“ICS”), which would replace traditional ad hoc party appointments with
fixed-term institutional ones.28 The EU has also proposed a similar
mechanism for ISDS, more generally, with the Multilateral Investment Court
(“MIC”).29 Will the introduction of such alternatives lead to the “Red
Wedding”30 for seasoned arbitrators?
My answer to this existential question is no. I predict that arbitration’s
Golden Summer will endure. The popularity of arbitration is not
circumstantial or “seasonal”; rather, it stems from advantages inherent to
arbitration as a process for settling disputes. Gary Born is right, there are
some people who want to put an “end [to] international arbitration as we
know it.”31 But he is also right that we can avoid the demolition of
arbitration.32
International arbitration has outlasted and will outlast its critics because it
functions well. I echo the words of Stephen Jagusch, Q.C., that arbitration
has “stood the test of time” and that “[i]t is here to stay.”33 Like Coca-Cola,
arbitration is confronted by challengers. Arbitration should not rest idly on
its laurels. But as Coca-Cola learned the hard and painful way, our response

Thrones: Hardhome (HBO television broadcast May 31, 2015) (showing the White
Walkers, an army of the undead, for the first time).
28. See ANNEX to the CETA Joint Committee Proposal for a Council Decision on
the Position to be taken on behalf of the European Union as Regards the Adoption of a
Decision Setting Out the Administrative and Organisational Matters Regarding the
Functioning of the Appellate Tribunal, at 1–2, COM (2019) 457 final (Nov. 10, 2019)
(proposing a fixed nine-year term for Members of the Appellate Tribunal, a decision
made pursuant to Article 8.28.7 of the CETA).
29. See Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Submission
from the European Union and its Member States, Rep. of the UNCITRAL in Preparation
for the Thirty-Seventh Session of Working Group III, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/
WP.159/Add.1, at 5 (Jan. 24, 2019) (proposing a nine-year non-renewable term for the
Appellate Tribunal).
30. The “Red Wedding” is a key turning point in the television show Game of
Thrones in which several protagonists are murdered, ending their storylines. Game of
Thrones: The Rains of Castamere (HBO television broadcast June 2, 2013) (portraying
a gruesome massacre that occurred in the aftermath of a wedding feast).
31. Ross, Winter Is Coming, supra note 26, at 8.
32. Id. at 11.
33. Alison Ross, The Winter Denier, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Dec. 21, 2017),
https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1151943/the-winter-denier [hereinafter Ross,
The Winter Denier].
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to challengers should not be to change what makes us successful.
I will review briefly at the outset the most recent iteration of the perpetual
debate surrounding international arbitration, including calls for quasijudicial institutions such as the MIC. I will then argue that the advantages
of arbitration over alternatives, such as the MIC, lead inexorably to the
conclusion that international arbitration will continue to be the premier
method for resolving cross-border disputes. I will then examine the prism of
future developments that confirm arbitration’s enduring relevance. Finally,
I will come to my conclusion that, like Coca-Cola, the arbitration community
should continue to do what it has done so well for decades — providing a
process that litigants like and want — and not change what we do in order to
please people who never wanted us to succeed in the first place.
II. THREATS OF WINTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
The debate about the merits of arbitration is not new. International
arbitration has long been the object of hostility and hyperbole. The World
Bank’s own ICSID has often been a lightning rod for criticism. Detractors
have accused the institution of bias in favor of corporations and lamented its
prohibitive costs and lack of an appeal mechanism.34 When Bolivia became
the first member state to leave ICSID in 2007, Bolivian President Evo
Morales claimed that “[t]he governments of Latin America . . . never win the
cases. The multinationals always win.”35
Surprisingly, even some arbitration insiders, such as Jan Paulsson and
Albert Jan van den Berg, have recently joined the chorus of critics unfamiliar
with the world of international arbitration. George Kahale, an otherwise
outstanding, very successful litigator and a veteran of many high profile
arbitrations, is now calling for ISDS’s eradication.36 Mr. Kahale claims that
ISDS “lack[s] . . . the normal safeguards of a serious legal system,” making
it “the Wild Wild West of international practice.”37 Despite the consistently
verified fact that states win more investment cases than they lose, Kahale
insists on the old canard that the system is biased against states.38 He now
encourages states to “actively explore the termination of ISDS provisions,”
and even claims that “ending or limiting a system . . . as dangerous as ISDS
34. See Silvia Karina Fiezzoni, The Challenge of UNASUR Member Countries to
Replace ICSID Arbitration, 2 BEIJING L. REV. 134, 134–36, 142 (2011).
35. Naomi Klein, Latin America’s Shock Resistance, THE NATION (Nov. 8, 2007),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/latin-americas-shock-resistance/.
36. Kudrna & Bilanová, supra note 25, at 14.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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is a good thing, even if it is done for the wrong reasons.”39
While Mr. Kahale proposes no alternative to ISDS,40 other critics envision
a MIC, with permanent members and an appellate mechanism.41 This
proposal is not new either; proposals for introducing appeals to ISDS have
floated around without much follow-through for many years.42 Now the
proponents of such changes seem more serious. Most notably, the EU has
seized on this proposal in its confused quest to kneecap an institution that
has benefitted its member states for decades.
In its submission to the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Working Group III, the EU stressed three main
categories of “concerns” with investor-state dispute settlement: “(i)
concerns pertaining to the lack of consistency, coherence, predictability, and
correctness of arbitral decisions by ICSID tribunals . . . (ii) concerns
pertaining to arbitrators, and decision makers . . . [and] (iii) concerns
pertaining to cost and duration of ISDS cases.”43 The EU considers these
concerns “systemic” and “intertwined.”44 In its view, they can only be
alleviated by replacing ad hoc arbitral appointments with a standing court
mechanism.45 The EU went as far as declaring, in 2018, that “[f]or the EU
ISDS is dead.”46
This standing court institution would be designed antithetically to ad hoc
international arbitration. It would resemble the promised but yet-to-bedelivered CETA multilateral investment tribunal and appellate mechanism.47
39. Id. at 16.
40. See id. at 15–16 (reporting that Kahale believes that any solution would

exacerbate the issues).
41. See, e.g., MARC BUNGENBERG & AUGUST REINISCH, FROM BILATERAL ARBITRAL
TRIBUNALS AND INVESTMENT COURTS TO A MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT COURT:
OPTIONS REGARDING THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 197–98 (2d ed. 2019).
42. Agnieszka Zarowna, Veeder and van den Berg on the Future of Investment
Arbitration, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Apr. 11, 2019), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/
article/1190127/veeder-and-van-den-berg-on-the-future-of-investment-arbitration.
43. Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Submission from
the European Union and its Member States, supra note 29, at 2–3.
44. Id. at 4.
45. Id.
46. A New EU Trade Agreement with Japan – Factsheet, at 6 (July 2018),
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/july/tradoc_155684.pdf (“A new system —
called the Investment Court System, with judges appointed by the two parties to the FTA
and public oversight — is the EU’s agreed approach that it is pursuing from now on in
its trade agreements. This is also the case with Japan.”).
47. See Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), Can.-Eur., art.
8.29, Oct. 28, 2016, 2017 O.J. (L 11).
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The EU proposes a permanent body comprised of two levels: a first instance
Tribunal and an Appellate Tribunal.48 These tribunals would be staffed with
full-time adjudicators held to strict ethical and diversity requirements.49 In
sum, the EU envisions an institution that would replace arbitration.
Gary Born has observed these developments with concern and sounded
the alarm. Born tells us that, like the Seven Kingdoms in Game of Thrones,
arbitration has enjoyed a “long, golden summer.”50 He writes that “[b]eyond
the walls and bustling marketplaces” of our kingdom, however, “lies a
terrifying ‘other world,’ where people are ‘predatory, not productive;
preoccupied with taking, not trading.’”51 The people of this other world, he
claims dramatically, “will tear down those walls, destroy everything that has
been created and usher in a ‘long, brutal winter.’”52
Gary Born’s Winter Is Coming paper aptly captures the severity of the
threat posed by recent criticisms of arbitration and proposals to abolish it.53
Where the analogy is imperfect, however, is that the forces conspiring
against arbitration are not simply strangers “beyond the walls” of our world.
George Kahale, for one, lives and practices among us and he is an
outstanding advocate. In other words — like in the horror classic When a
Stranger Calls — the call is coming from inside the house.
Fortunately, many distinguished members of the arbitration community
have recently reacted vigorously to this contestation of what I refer to as
“classic arbitration.” Campbell McLachlan, a renowned arbitrator from New
Zealand, spoke last month of the assault on international adjudication in his
keynote Lalive Lecture.54 Campbell McLachlan referred to the “growing
opposition” to “investment arbitration and . . . termination of bilateral
investment treaties” as evidence of a more general “trend towards
withdrawal from international adjudication.”55
Focusing more specifically on the debate and controversy surrounding the
new proposed international investment court, my friend the Honorable

48. Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Submission from
the European Union and its Member States, supra note 29, at 4.
49. Id. at 5.
50. Ross, Winter Is Coming, supra note 26, at 8.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 8–10 (articulating threats to arbitration).
54. Augustin Barrier & Lea Murphy, McLachlan: The Assault on International
Adjudication, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Sept. 11, 2019), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/
article/1196684/mclachlan-the-assault-on-international-adjudication.
55. Id.
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Charles Brower has repeatedly denounced its many follies.56 Charles Brower
has strongly criticized not just the new proposal for the Court, but the entire
overreaction against arbitration itself, in what he has famously coined as the
“Demolition Derby.”57 He has noted that “[t]he ‘Demolition Derby’
targeting ISDS is flourishing, doubtless confident of victory thanks to the
UNCITRAL Commission’s welcoming attitude toward the EU’s relentless
campaign to sell to the world its Investment Court System.”58
I agree with Charles Brower and with Gary Born that “winter need not
come.”59 I place my confidence in arbitration’s inherent strengths, which
will outlast any intemperate season. The backlash against investor-state
arbitration is at least partially attributable to those who participate in
arbitration but fail to proclaim its benefits.60 To “ensure [our own] survival,”
Born calls on us to “stress” the “five Es” of arbitration: “efficiency,
expedition, expertise, evenhandedness, and enforceability.”61 I agree. Even
well-intentioned attempts to correct perceived flaws with arbitration
jeopardize these proven benefits.
III. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CONTINUING THE GOLDEN SUMMER
Arbitration has many well-known advantages. They need to be mentioned
briefly even if we are all familiar with them. Arbitration is a consent-based
mechanism where parties appoint a decision maker or decision makers to
determine a binding resolution of their dispute. This classic formula has
operated successfully for thousands of years. The Ancient Mesopotamians,
Greeks, Romans, groups in Africa and India, and even merchants in Europe,
of all places, all used some forms of arbitration.62 Such diverse usage
endures today. For instance, sheiks in Iraq continue to serve as arbitrators
56. See generally Charles N. Brower & Jawad Ahmad, From the Two-Headed
Nightingale to the Fifteen-Headed Hydra: The Many Follies of the Proposed
International Investment Court, 41 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 791 (2018) (criticizing the
CETA proposal for an international investment court).
57. See Charles N. Brower & Jawad Ahmad, Why the “Demolition Derby” That
Seeks to Destroy Investor-State Arbitration?, 91 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1139, 1141 (2018)
(defining and detailing the “Demolition Derby”).
58. Id. at 1184.
59. Ross, Winter Is Coming, supra note 26, at 11.
60. See Zarowna, supra note 42 (citing “misperception” as one of the reasons for
pushback to ISDS).
61. Ross, Winter Is Coming, supra note 26, at 10.
62. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 8–9 (2nd ed.
2014) (documenting the use of international arbitration by ancient civilizations); see also
L. Yves Fortier, Delimiting the Spheres of Judicial and Arbitral Power: “Beware, My
Lord, of Jealousy” 80 CAN. B. REV. 143, 145–46 (2001).
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among feuding tribes.63 Such widespread and longstanding use speaks to
arbitration’s intrinsic appeal: it takes the dispute out of the hands of those
locked in disagreement and refers to neutral, respected decision makers the
resolution of their conflict once and for all.
As a corollary of its basis in consent, the parties will choose their
arbitrators, men or women versed in the issues underlying the dispute, and
will agree on the procedure to be followed. Barring public policy concerns,
the parties decide what is arbitrable. Then, they can opt for a complex,
multifaceted dispute, or simply seek clarification of a single contractual
provision. When the award is issued, the dispute is resolved definitely,
except for very limited grounds for annulment or denial of recognition and
enforcement. By virtue of the New York Convention, arbitral awards can be
enforced in the vast majority of countries around the world.64
These fundamental characteristics, which are at the heart of arbitration,
have been scapegoated for perceived problems with arbitration. Most
notably, critics submit that ad hoc party appointees may be biased.65
Resolving disputes definitely, without an appellate process, may force
parties to live with flawed decisions.66 Such criticisms mistake advantages
for disadvantages. These characteristics are the hallmarks of arbitration that
make the process successful; they are not flaws that need correction.
I will review them briefly in turn. I commence with the appointment of
arbitrators by the disputing parties which has been singled out for a variety
of grievances. The EU’s submission to UNCITRAL Working Group III
credits party selection of arbitrators for arbitrator bias, procedural delays,
and gender disparity. This is of course the principal difference between
arbitration and litigation. Each party to an arbitration selects as one of his
adjudicators, a person he or she knows is well versed in the many facets of
the dispute. It is a feature of arbitration that presents parties with certain
trade-offs that would not necessarily disappear with a standing court of
arbitrators.
Proponents of a standing body claim that it would improve ISDS’s
perceived lack of impartiality. Their reasoning, in my view, is somewhat
suspect and myopic. A standing body would supposedly “insulate decision
63. See Rent-a-Sheikh, ECONOMIST, June 1, 2019, at 44.
64. Contracting States, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconvention.

org/countries (last visited Nov. 28, 2020).
65. See Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Submission
from the European Union and its Member States, supra note 29, at 9–11 (acknowledging
concerns about the ad hoc party-appointment system).
66. Cf. id. at 9–10 (discussing the relevance of the appeal process for ensuring
accuracy).
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makers from ‘powerful private interest’” and eliminate the pressure to
deliver awards that will encourage parties to reappoint them.67 Whether a
standing body of arbitrators is more independent than arbitrators appointed
by the parties depends on one’s perspective.
It might be more accurate to say that such a body would reduce perceived,
but statistically unverified, pro-investor bias. I ask, would the trade-off
become a pro-state bias? As Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Michele
Potestà wrote, if states make appointments to an institution, “[t]here may be
an inherent risk that only or mainly ‘pro-State’ individuals [will] be selected,
especially if they were to be paid by the States alone.”68 I agree.
Are we prepared to deny disputing parties the right, associated with
arbitration from time immemorial, to select decision makers with the
expertise, experience, and overall DNA they consider essential for the fair
resolution of their dispute and substitute women and men of a quasi-judicial
institution endowed with general, as opposed to specific, qualifications? I
do not think so. And let us not forget the role of the neutral chairperson
appointed either by the parties themselves or by an arbitral institution. The
Chair, [who generally projects immense gravitas], will, in my experience,
often succeed in convincing his or her two party-appointed colleagues to join
in a unanimous decision. And, if I may add, based on my experience in the
noble profession of arbitration, after a few sessions as chair with my two
party-appointed colleagues, I often forget which one was appointed by which
party.
In other words, the system, as it exists today, works. Eliminating the
appointment by parties of their adjudicators is not a guarantee that the system
would be improved. And let us not forget that judges whose term would
need to be fixed may also, with time, be seen to be biased. While the
proposed code of conduct might be helpful to quell allegations of bias, the
prohibition against double-hatting might well cause even more damage. By
prohibiting judges from also acting as counsel, the development and training
of the next arbitration generation, as well as the diversity within the
arbitration community, risks being seriously hampered.
The EU also posits that significant delays and unreasonable costs are
67. See GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-KOHLER & MICHELE POTESTÀ, CIDS – GENEVA
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, CAN THE MAURITIUS CONVENTION
SERVE AS A MODEL FOR THE REFORM OF INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION IN CONNECTION
WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF A PERMANENT INVESTMENT TRIBUNAL OR AN APPEAL
MECHANISM? 18 (2016), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/commissionsessions/unc/
unc-49/CIDS_Research_Paper_-_Can_the_Mauritius_Convention_serve_as_a_
model.pdf.
68. Id. at 20.
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associated with arbitration. It refers in particular, in this connection, to the
many challenges levied against arbitrators in recent years which, of
necessity, led to a suspension of the proceedings.69
The subject of my conference tonight is not “[a]rbitrator challenges, are
they justified or not?” This could be the topic of an interesting conference
or a lively panel discussion at some other time. But I do say: why criticize
a party to an arbitration for ensuring that every one of his or her adjudicators
is free from conflicts? Yes, there are some challenges that are driven by
strategy rather than genuine concern about the independence of an arbitrator.
But those ill-conceived challenges are few and far between and can be dealt
with in cost awards.
Before I leave the impact of challenges on procedural delays in arbitration,
I note an intriguing suggestion by Gary Born, who has proposed imposing a
duty to investigate on parties.70 Such a duty could put the onus on parties to
search for challengeable conflicts or alleged indicators of bias early in the
arbitration. This investigation by the parties themselves, combined with a
waiver of the right to challenge when challenges are not raised in a timely
manner, could be implemented on a temporary basis by one of our arbitral
institutions.
What matters most is the integrity of the arbitral process. I submit that
some delay is a small price to pay in order to ensure party autonomy,
recognized expertise, and confirmed impartiality. Would a quasi-judicial
tribunal juggling dozens, and eventually hundreds, of cases be more efficient
than an arbitral panel constituted in order to decide a well-defined dispute?
I doubt it. One only needs to look at the national courts in Canada or the
United States to see how clogged court systems can get. I do not have a
crystal ball, but I venture to say that permanent judges sitting comfortably
on a bench, appointed for a fixed term without any input from the parties,
would eventually become less efficient and more likely to issue decisions
within timelines far more significant than those which, on average, arbitral
tribunals do.
For me, delays experienced in arbitration due to challenges and the time
taken to complete the constitution of tribunals are not as problematic as the
EU and other critics of the present proven system make them out to be. All
the more so when, on a balance sheet, they are compared to party autonomy
to answer the central question: who is more qualified to adjudicate my case?
Eliminating that paramount feature of classic arbitration in order to save a
69. Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Submission from
the European Union and its Member States, supra note 29, at 11–12.
70. See BORN, supra note 62, at 1919.
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few months of what is, by definition, a lengthy process is not a proportionate
and reasonable way to address the perceived problem.
Another criticism levied against arbitration and party appointments is the
alleged gender gap among arbitrators. Let me be clear. I start from the
premise that although the gender gap has abated today, it has not disappeared
but, there is significant and encouraging progress. The glass ceiling has been
broken and a number of very competent women now sit as arbitrators.
Furthermore, there are many highly qualified women lawyers climbing the
ladder who will eventually qualify as very competent arbitrators. While
there is still much to be done to remedy the “diversity deficit” in investment
arbitration,71 I note the significant recent initiatives which promote equal
representation in arbitration, such as the Pledge.72 Similar initiatives need to
be encouraged.
Allow me nevertheless to debunk briefly the EU proposal that a standing
tribunal could have built-in “selection criteria” that would ensure gender
balance.73 This proposal underlines a simple fact: if a standing tribunal with
gender parity replaces ad hoc tribunals with party-appointed arbitrators, the
gender gap in ISDS will be eliminated, at least in the disputes that end up
before that tribunal.
Such a reform, however, while it could increase the percentage of women
arbitrators, would do so at the expense of decreasing the overall number of
women arbitrators. A standing tribunal with permanent appointees would
centralize the market for arbitrators and thereby reduce the total number of
arbitrators needed to administer the ever-increasing universe of arbitrations.
This would limit the number of opportunities for women to serve as
arbitrators. Gender parity is an essential objective, but the EU’s proposed
innovation would limit, rather than increase, more opportunities for more
women.
I recognize of course that there are more advantages to gender parity than
simply the number of women who can be appointed as arbitrators. It may
well be that having fewer women arbitrators but having some women with
71. See generally Andrea Kay Bjorklund, The Diversity Deficit in Investment
Arbitration, EUR. J. INT’L L.: EJIL: TALK! (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/thediversity-deficit-in-investment-arbitration/ (noting the majority of the influential
arbitrators are from either North America or Europe and that only two are women).
72. EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN ARBITRATION, http://www.arbitrationpledge.com/
(last visited Nov. 28, 2020) (explaining that signatories involved in international
arbitration pledge to improve the profile and representation of women in arbitration by
appointing women as arbitrators).
73. See Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Submission
from the European Union and its Member States, supra note 29, at 11.
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permanent appointments on a standing tribunal may be preferable to a higher
absolute number of women serving as arbitrators. One of the challenges of
addressing the gender gap in arbitration is weighing these possibilities
against each other. The EU proposal fails to engage with these
considerations.74
I now turn to what I consider to be the most egregious example of the
strident criticism of arbitration portraying a weakness that is truly a strength.
I refer to the fact that there is no appeal from the award or decision of an
arbitral tribunal. We can all agree that, whatever its advantages, appeals of
arbitral decisions would prolong the dispute, which the parties have
submitted to arbitration.
The main argument in favor of allowing appeals in arbitration is that
appeals would improve the consistency of awards. ISDS observers have
raised concerns regarding “divergent interpretations of substantive
standards, divergent interpretations relating to jurisdiction and admissibility,
and procedural inconsistency” in awards.75
Compounding these
shortcomings is what has been referred to as ISDS’s “[l]ack of appropriate
control mechanisms” that could “reverse incorrect decisions and . . . sanction
incompetent arbitrators.”76 Allowing appeals would establish a “second
level of adjudication,” where mistakes could be reviewed and standard
interpretations could be upheld.77
I will accept, for the sake of argument, that appeals could improve
consistency and cure manifestly incorrect decisions, although I have serious
doubts that such improvements will happen. Whether an appellate process
will result in awards which are more consistent will depend in large measure
on whether appellate tribunals will follow precedent.78 Will they introduce
the stare decisis principle? Absent a unanimous decision on this front, it is
74. See Bjorklund, supra note 71 (explaining the arbitration system could require
that all arbitrator appointments source from a roster made up of diverse individuals and
could create an appellate body that is inherently diverse from the appointment of the
members).
75. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Report of Working Group III (Investor-State
Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of Its Thirty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/964, at 6 (2018) (noting that one factor for a difference in arbitral awards is that
the rules of treaty interpretation require a tribunal to consider more than the plain
meaning of the text and allow the tribunal to hear arguments with extrinsic evidence).
76. KAUFMANN-KOHLER & POTESTÀ, supra note 67, at 14.
77. Id. at 18.
78. See id. at 17 (explaining that a new appellate procedure would establish a per se
level of consistency in the tribunals’ decisions); see also id. at 47 (stating that it would
be more practical to limit the “stare decisis effect” to the specific international
investment arbitration dispute).
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unclear how consistency will improve.
In the arbitration system it should not be assumed that inconsistency
between awards is necessarily problematic. It is a truism that different
results may stem from the arbitrators’ different backgrounds, experiences, or
expertise. Factual matrices may be different. We all know that every dispute
is unique. In my long experience as a trial lawyer and as an arbitrator, I can
truly say that I have never seen two cases which were, in every respect,
identical. In other words, what may be seen as a mistake today may be found
tomorrow to be justified as a valid distinction that fits the unique factual
matrix of a case.
Moreover, in a system of party-appointed arbitrators, divergent outcomes
could result from the distinct inputs of arbitral awards, which suggests that
differences between decisions reflect tailoring to unique disputes and not
simply mistakes. And, let us remember that what constitutes a “mistake” in
an arbitral context is very subjective. Who is to say that an appellate division
which issues binding precedents will always get it right? As we all know,
appellate courts are not immune from criticism for issuing blatantly incorrect
rulings.79
I submit that appeals are undesirable in the arbitral context because they
undermine the finality of the award and they increase costs and delays. From
time immemorial, parties who have resorted to arbitration look for finality.
In the investor-state context, this is inscribed in Article 53 of the ICSID
Convention, which prohibits appeals of ICSID awards.80 If appeals are
allowed, I predict that there would be a tsunami of appeals by the losing
parties. To convince oneself of this prediction, one needs only to focus on
the number of annulment proceedings in the ICSID system.81
And then, I call in aid of my submission the well-known, age-old
philosophical principle that “what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the
gander.” What about the additional delays and increased costs which will
certainly be associated with appeals of arbitral awards, particularly if these
appeals include issues of law and fact de novo.
Arbitration is a dispute resolution process for settling disputes definitively.
79. See, e.g., Andrea Sachs, The Worst Supreme Court Decisions Since 1960, TIME
(Oct. 6, 2015), http://time.com/4056051/worst-supreme-court-decisions/ (detailing
several accounts of criticism from law school professors on monumental U.S. Supreme
Court decisions like Roe v. Wade, Bush v. Gore, and Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission).
80. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, art. 53, Mar. 5, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159
(entered into force Oct. 14, 1966).
81. KAUFMANN-KOHLER & POTESTÀ, supra note 67, at 46–47.
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Finality is not a bug of the system, but rather, in my estimation, one of its
most attractive features. It is and should remain one of the hallmarks of
arbitration. In the meantime, while critics of ISDS, often uninformed about
the system, continue to vituperate and propose to do away with partyappointed arbitrators in favor of a standing body of judges, arbitration,
“classic arbitration” as I call it, continues to prosper.
As I noted earlier, arbitral institutions such as the ICC, the LCIA, the
American Arbitration Association, ICSID, and the Permanent Court of
Arbitration are recording exponential growth in the number of arbitrations
they facilitate and developing markets in Asia, such as Hong Kong and
Singapore, and are asserting themselves as enthusiastic proponents of the
Golden Summer. Yes, arbitration is truly booming in Asia. Hong Kong and
Singapore are becoming the new London and Paris.
As some of arbitration’s longstanding beneficiaries quarrel over how well
it has served them, new players have rushed to embrace arbitration’s
advantages.82 Developing markets in Asia present auspicious opportunities
for the arbitration community, and turmoil in other parts of the world
legitimizes the need for impartial international dispute resolution.
I will now review briefly how Hong Kong and Singapore have bolstered
arbitration in Asia, the opportunities presented by China’s entrance into the
wider arbitration community, and how increasingly unstable domestic
politics make arbitration more relevant and necessary than ever. Hong Kong
has hosted arbitrations since 1985.83 The Hong Kong International
Arbitration Centre (“HKIAC”) received 521 new cases in 2018 and the
disputing parties came from thirty-nine jurisdictions.84 More than forty
percent of them had no connection to Hong Kong; 5.2 percent of them had
no connection to Asia.85
Singapore, in recent years, has made a state-assisted, concerted effort to
assert itself as a world-renowned capital for international dispute resolution.
It has a world-class arbitration center and a growing caseload. While the
Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”) has been in operation
82. See Ross, Winter Is Coming, supra note 26, at 10 (discussing how countries like
Singapore and China are making strides in the “establishment of new international
commercial courts”).
83. At a Glance, H.K. INT’L ARB. CTR., https://www.hkiac.org/about-us (last visited
Nov. 28, 2020).
84. Statistics, H.K. INT’L ARB. CTR., https://www.hkiac.org/about-us/statistics (last
visited Nov. 28, 2020).
85. H.K. INT’L ARBITRATION CTR., ANNUAL REPORT: 2017 REFLECTIONS 9 (2017)
https://www.hkiac.org/sites/default/files/annual_report/2017%20HKIAC%20Annual%
20Report%203469-5010-8172%20v.1.pdf.
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since 1991, its caseload has seen exponential growth in the twenty-first
century. 86 The SIAC handled ninety cases in 2006.87 Ten years later, it
handled 343.88 Singapore has been named as the ICC’s top arbitral seat in
Asia eight times in recent years.89
Singapore offers disputing parties a comprehensive regime for dispute
resolution. In addition to the SIAC, Singapore is home to an equivalent
institution for mediation: the Singapore International Mediation Centre.90 In
2015, Singapore established a separate division of its High Court for
international commercial disputes, the Singapore International Commercial
Court (“SICC”).91 The latest addition to Singapore’s panoply of dispute
resolution options is the ICC’s new case management office in Maxwell
Chambers.92 Notably, these institutions do not compete against one
another.93 As the SICC has explained:
The SICC serves as a companion rather than a competitor to arbitration as
it seeks to provide parties in transnational business with one more option
among a suite of viable alternatives to resolve transnational commercial
disputes. It enhances Singapore’s share of the global legal services pie
without compromising Singapore’s success as a seat of international
arbitration as well as the international recognition and acclaim enjoyed by
the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC).94

Statistics suggest a mutually supportive relationship between Singapore’s
various institutions. Since the SICC’s establishment, the SIAC’s caseload
has grown at a most impressive rate. In both 2017 and 2018, SIAC was the

86. About Us, SING. INT’L ARB. CTR., https://www.siac.org.sg/2014-11-03-13-3343/about-us (last visited Nov. 28, 2020).
87. Statistics, SING. INT’L ARB. CTR., http://siac.org.sg/2014-11-03-13-33-43/factsfigures/statistics (last visited Nov. 28, 2020).
88. Id.
89. ICC Court Case Management Team Begins Operations in Singapore, INT’L
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Apr. 23, 2018), https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/newsspeeches/icc-court-case-management-team-begins-operations-singapore/.
90. Lucy Reed, International Dispute Resolution Courts: Retreat or Advance?, 4
MCGILL J. DISP. RESOL. 129, 140 (2017–2018).
91. Id. at 132.
92. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 89.
93. See Reed, supra note 90, at 140 (discussing the establishment of the SICC in
Singapore); see also Establishment of the SICC, SING. INT’L COM. CT.,
https://www.sicc.gov.sg/about-the-sicc/establishment-of-the-sicc (last updated May 2,
2019) [hereinafter SICC, Establishment] (stating the SICC is more of a “companion”
than “competitor” to arbitration).
94. SICC, Establishment, supra note 93.
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venue for more than 400 new cases.95 There were 271 new cases in 2015.96
In 2018, the disputing parties came from sixty-five different jurisdictions,
and so on. 97 Yes, “classic arbitration” continues to enjoy the Golden
Summer.98
This coexistence of fora and methodologies is characteristic of arbitration
and an element in its success. Arbitration does not have, and has never
aspired to have, a monopoly of resolving disputes. It is and has always been
available as a proven option for parties who seek to avail themselves of
arbitration’s recognized advantages. Disputes can be complex, and the
parties’ needs are multi-dimensional. A range of dispute resolution options
ensures that diverse issues and parties are served appropriately. As statistics
for Hong Kong and Singapore demonstrate, many parties continue to prefer
arbitration, even when other options are available.
And, what about China? Will it become a new frontier? Some indicia
suggest that it is poised to become increasingly involved in the arbitration
bandwagon. In 2017, the China International Economic and Trade
Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”) published new rules for investor-state
arbitration.99 The alternative venues for arbitrations subject to these rules
are the CIETAC Investment Dispute Settlement Centre (“IDSC”) in Beijing,
or, if the parties expressly agree, in Hong Kong (“CIETAC HK”).100 This is
an encouraging development.
China’s openness to arbitration is connected to its massive One Belt One
Road (“OBOR”) initiative which has generated, and will continue to
generate, a significant number of arbitral proceedings.101 The OBOR
Arbitration Centre created by the Wuhan Arbitration Commission has
already heard several disputes arising from OBOR projects.102
China has announced that it intends to set up an international court for

95. SING. INT’L ARBITRATION CTR., ANNUAL REPORT 2018 14 (2018); SING. INT’L
ARBITRATION CTR., ANNUAL REPORT 2017 11 (2017).
96. ANNUAL REPORT 2018, supra note 95, at 15; ANNUAL REPORT 2017, supra note
95, at 13.
97. ANNUAL REPORT 2018, supra note 95, at 17.
98. See SING. INT’L ARBITRATION CTR., ANNUAL REPORT 2015 14 (2015) (tabulating
the number of new cases per nationality in 2015).
99. Keith M. Brandt & Michael K.H. Kan, China, 9 INT’L ARBITRATION REV. 121,
123 (2018).
100. Id. at 124.
101. See How China Will Change the International Arbitration Field, COLUM. L. SCH.
(Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.law.columbia.edu/news/archive/how-china-will-changeinternational-arbitration-field [hereinafter How China Will Change].
102. See Brandt & Kan, supra note 99, at 124.
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OBOR disputes.103 While the Court has not yet materialized, the gigantic
infrastructure facets of the OBOR project will certainly engender disputes
which would be amenable to arbitration.104 How will non-Chinese parties
react to a court overseen by the Chinese state?105 I predict that arbitration
will be preferred to a Chinese court. But, either way, China’s emergence as
a fledging participant in investor-state dispute resolution is another
encouraging development for the international arbitration community.
Before I conclude, allow me to touch briefly on recent geopolitical
developments which, I submit, are either arbitration neutral or arbitration
boosting. It is trite to note that some governments are becoming increasingly
hostile to foreign trade. Tariffs, as you know well in this country, have been
increasingly used as economic weapons of mass destruction. Perhaps
counterintuitively, however, these ominous developments point to the
continued relevance on, and need for, arbitration. As some governments are
overtaken by political parties and leaders guided by autarkic policy agendas,
the prospect of litigating in domestic courts is becoming less appealing.106
I note that many domestic political developments, such as Brexit in the
United Kingdom, or the continuing trade dispute between the United States
and China, that impact relations between countries and give ulcers to the
business community, do not have any effect on arbitration. Despite the
negative impact, Brexit, whether it is hard or soft, will almost certainly have
an impact on London as a financial center, and it is clear that it is unlikely to
impact London as one of the most popular venues for arbitrations. Brexit
will not change the United Kingdom’s commitment to the New York
Convention, the 1996 English Arbitration Act, or English common law that
is arbitration-friendly.107 Nor has it fundamentally altered “the conditions
that make London central to arbitration,” such as the English language and
the city’s wealth of legal talent.108 After a hard or a soft Brexit, London may
well benefit from a greater perception of neutrality in disputes involving
member states of the EU. The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) decisions

103. Id. at 121.
104. How China Will Change, supra note 101.
105. See Brandt & Kan, supra note 99, at 125 (noting international participants’

concerns with the validity of a court operating under Chinese jurisdiction).
106. How China Will Change, supra note 101.
107. Joe Liu, Keep Calm and Arbitrate? The Impact of Political Events on
International Arbitration, WOLTERS KLUWER: KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Oct. 11,
2017), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/10/11/keep-calm-arbitrate-imp
act-political-events-international-arbitration/.
108. How China Will Change, supra note 101.
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criticizing arbitration may well drown in the English Channel.109
Undoubtedly, however, governments seeking to undermine arbitration can
do so particularly with respect to investor-state arbitration. President Trump
has taken, early in his tenure, decisions that have impacted negatively the
recourse to arbitration. I refer, notably, to the United States’ withdrawal
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and repeal of the investor-dispute
settlement provisions in the North American Free Trade Agreement
(“NAFTA”) in its renegotiated version, the new United States-MexicoCanada Agreement (“USMCA”).110 But the United States remains a proarbitration jurisdiction, where disputing parties have an embarrassment of
riches which facilitate domestic and international arbitration, and where
arbitral awards are easily enforced.111
IV. CONCLUSION
Yes, arbitration has been challenged in recent years. Intra-EU investorstate arbitration with Slovak Republic v. Achmea B.V.,112 and other decisions
have been boxed against the ropes, but intra-European commercial
arbitration is flourishing. To my knowledge, all objections to jurisdictions
109. See Liu, supra note 107; see also Opinion 2/15, EU-Singapore Free Trade
Agreement, 2017 EUR-Lex CELEX 62015CV0002(01) (May 16, 2017) (stating that
ISDS is a shared competence, with the CETA being declared a mixed agreement to be
ratified by the EU and its Member States); Opinion 1/17, EU-Canada CET Agreement,
2019 EUR-Lex CELEX 62017CV0001(02) (Apr. 30, 2019) (confirming the
compatibility of EU law and the Investor Court System, to be established as part of the
CETA); Case C-284/16, Slovak Republic v. Achmea B.V., 2018 E.C.R. 158 (ruling that
the arbitration clause in the 1991 Netherlands-Slovakia bilateral investment treaty is
incompatible with EU law due to the adverse effect on the EU’s autonomy); Joined Cases
T-694/15, T-694/15 & T-704/15, Micula v. Comm’n, 2019 E.C.R. 423 (ruling that the
European Commission is precluded from applying EU State aid rules to pre-accession
periods).
110. See How China Will Change, supra note 101.
111. See, e.g., The US Supreme Court Confirms the United States is a Pro-Arbitration
Jurisdiction, DENTONS (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/alerts/
2019/january/28/the-us-supreme-court-confirms-the-united-states-is-a-pro-arbitrationjurisdiction (explaining how the United States is a pro-arbitration state because the
arbitration clause “delegates the decision of arbitrability to the arbitrators” and not the
courts); see also Eric Tuchmann, In an Unruly World, International Arbitration Offers a
Safe Haven for Business Disputes, CORP. COUNS. BUS. J. (Sept. 6, 2018), https://ccb
journal.com/articles/unruly-world-international-arbitration-offers-safe-haven-businessdisputes (detailing the benefits of arbitration in resolving conflicts in international
businesses transactions, particularly with rising geopolitical volatility and uncertainty).
112. Slovak Republic v. Achmea B.V., 2018 E.C.R. 158 (holding that bilateral
investment treaties between EU member states, such as the 1991 Netherlands-Slovakia
BIT, were potentially incompatible with EU law because they permitted investors and
EU member states to establish alternative dispute resolution mechanisms).
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relying on Achmea have been rejected. As Eric Tuchmann wrote recently,
“[i]n an unruly world, international arbitration offers a safe haven for
business disputes.”113 The Golden Summer is going to continue and prosper.
Those of us who are dedicated members of this noble profession — because,
yes, arbitration is a profession — need to stand up and proclaim loudly and
clearly its benefits and advantages.
Brexit, President Trump, and decisions of the ECJ are unlikely to seriously
stifle arbitration. Any perception that certain jurisdictions are unfriendly to
foreign businesses will simply encourage those businesses to take their
capital elsewhere or to avoid domestic courts and seek out neutral fora where
they can settle disputes with the assistance of impartial and skilled
facilitators.
Global capitalism is dynamic and relentless. International trade and
investment will continue to flourish despite attempts to restrain it.114
Businesses and entrepreneurs will find the best places to invest, a calculation
that includes the ability to protect their investment. Arbitration has long been
the safe haven for businesses confronted with international disputes, and I
predict that its supporters will continue to seek out the advantages it offers
over litigation.115
Arbitration’s success is not circumstantial. Its popularity has grown
despite the criticism it faces because it is a proven and effective method for
settling complex disputes that do not lend themselves well to adjudication in
domestic courts. Arbitration is successful precisely because it is not like
litigation. Given its track record for success, as well as increasing
uncertainties and risks on our fragile planet, arbitration’s Golden Summer
should continue. To ensure the continued future success of arbitration, we
need not engage in reforms that could compromise its classic and
characteristic strengths. As you may have guessed by now, I come to my
conclusion by returning to my opening foray in colas.
Trying to make arbitration more like litigation is tantamount to making
Coca-Cola taste like Pepsi. Some people will always prefer Pepsi to CocaCola, and that is just fine. People who prefer Pepsi can buy Pepsi. Pepsi is
a successful product, and Pepsi is a very successful company. Pepsi, in some
ways, is a more successful company than Coca-Cola.116 However, Pepsi is
113.
114.
115.
116.

Tuchmann, supra note 111.
Liu, supra note 107.
Tuchmann, supra note 111.
Paul R. La Monica, Pepsi Beats Coke Thanks to Junk Food, CNN BUSINESS
(Sept. 29, 2016, 10:31 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2016/09/29/investing/pepsi-cokeearnings-stock/index.html.
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a more successful business because it does more than sell beverages; it owns
Frito-Lay, which is responsible for forty percent of its profits.117 Coca-Cola
doesn’t sell chips. Coca-Cola sells beverages; in particular, Coca-Cola sells
soft drinks. The most popular soft drink in the world is Coca-Cola.118 The
second most popular is Diet Coca-Cola.119 Pepsi may be better than CocaCola at certain things, but no one is better at making and selling cola than
Coca-Cola.
Like Coca-Cola, the arbitration community should not try to replicate its
competitors’ products. People who want to go to court can go to court. The
people whom the arbitration community serves do not want to go to court.
As Gary Born has pointed out, as my friend Charles Brower has said
forcefully, and as I have stressed tonight, for millennia, many people have
preferred arbitration to litigation.120 Disputing parties prefer arbitration not
because it is almost like litigation, but because arbitration is different from
litigation and all the better for that difference. Litigation may be preferable
to arbitration for certain litigants. But arbitration should not sacrifice what
it does well in order to replicate features of litigation that do not make sense
in the world of arbitration.
People who want arbitration to be like litigation do not want arbitration.
People who like arbitration do not want it to be like litigation. So why would
we, members of the worldwide arbitration community, impose changes on
the people who like what we do, for the sake of people who will never like
what we do? Like Coca-Cola, we have happy and loyal customers who like
our product. Let us not sell them imitation Pepsi in Coca-Cola bottles.
To the “New Coca-Cola” proponents of international dispute resolution, I
say: you may be able to persuade some people that they prefer a product
with a different flavor based on a mere taste test. But novelty grows old and
soon tastes stale. After a while, people will not want a product that is trying
to be something else. They will want the qualities and advantages that
brought them to arbitration in the first place.
Coca-Cola won the Cola Wars because it stopped trying to be Pepsi.
Through its “New Coca-Cola” misadventure, Coca-Cola learned what its real
strengths were. Wisely, it went back to playing to those strengths instead of
its competitor’s. Arbitration will win the dispute resolution Game of Thrones
if it does the same. Like Coca-Cola, when it comes to cross-border dispute
117. Id.
118. See Yglesias, supra note 4 (inferring Coca-Cola’s dominant market position

reflects its popularity among consumers).
119. Id.
120. Ross, Winter Is Coming, supra note 26.
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resolution, “You Can’t Beat the Real Thing.”121

121. See THE COCA-COLA COMPANY, supra note 6 (1990 slogan).
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